Three instruments, three legal regimes
“Guarantee”, “suretyship” and “demand guarantee” are used almost interchangeably in everyday business speech, and that loose usage causes real loss. The three are governed by entirely different legal rules, and the difference decides the most important practical questions you can ask of any security: when the giver has to pay, what defences they have, and whether the instrument is even valid.
- Suretyship — an accessory obligation. The surety promises to pay the principal debtor’s debt; the surety’s liability is parasitic on that debt and disappears if the debt is invalid, paid or extinguished. It must be in writing and signed.
- On-demand (performance) guarantee — a primary, autonomous obligation. The guarantor must pay on a conforming demand, irrespective of disputes under the underlying contract. The only escape is proof of fraud by the beneficiary.
- Credit guarantee (NCA s 8(5)) — a statutory label that catches a guarantee only where it backs a credit facility or credit transaction to which the National Credit Act applies. It is about regulatory reach, not about the common-law nature of the instrument.
The drafting lesson runs throughout this guide: decide which instrument you actually want, then make the document say so unambiguously. A court will read the words you used in their substance, not by the heading on the page.
Suretyship: the accessory obligation
A suretyship is the classic security of the credit world. The surety undertakes to the creditor that, if the principal debtor does not perform, the surety will. Its defining feature is that it is accessory: the surety’s obligation exists only to secure the principal debtor’s obligation, and therefore tracks it. If the principal debt is void, never came into existence, or is later discharged, the suretyship cannot stand on its own — there is nothing left to secure.
Our courts have long explained that accessory logic in the closely related field of security cessions. In Grobler v Oosthuizen the Supreme Court of Appeal worked through the “accessory nature” of a cession in securitatem debiti — without a principal debt the security cannot stand, “and it matters not whether the principal debt is extinguished or never existed at all”. The same dependence on a valid principal obligation is the hallmark of a true suretyship, and it is exactly what distinguishes it from the autonomous guarantee discussed below.
Two consequences flow from that accessory character: the surety can generally raise the principal debtor’s defences against the creditor, and because the surety’s obligation depends on the principal debt, an interruption or delay in the running of prescription against the principal debtor works against the surety too. The Supreme Court of Appeal settled the prescription point in Jans v Nedcor Bank:
That accessory character is precisely what a creditor who wants certainty of payment may try to escape — which is the whole reason the on-demand guarantee exists.
The formality that makes or breaks a suretyship: s 6
A suretyship is one of the few contracts in South African law that the legislature has subjected to a strict writing requirement. Section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 makes an oral suretyship void — not merely difficult to prove, but a legal nullity. The written document must embody the terms of the suretyship and be signed by or on behalf of the surety.
No contract of suretyship entered into after the commencement of this Act, shall be valid, unless the terms thereof are embodied in a written document signed by or on behalf of the surety: Provided that nothing in this section contained shall affect the liability of the signer of an aval under the laws relating to negotiable instruments.
Note — On the long-settled interpretation of “the terms thereof” — the leading authorities being Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 1 (A) and Fourlamel v Maddison 1977 (1) SA 333 (A) — the written suretyship must enable the essential terms to be ascertained from it: the identity of the creditor, the surety and the principal debtor, and the nature and amount of the principal debt. The aval proviso preserves the separate liability of someone who signs a bill of exchange as guarantor under the law of negotiable instruments.
The practical consequence is unforgiving. A creditor who relies on an unsigned, incomplete or purely oral suretyship has no security at all. This is also why almost every commercial suretyship is signed “as surety and co-principal debtor” with an express renunciation of the benefits of excussion (the right to insist the creditor sue the principal debtor first) and division (the right of one of several co-sureties to be sued only for a proportionate share). Those renunciations make the surety directly and jointly liable — but they do not convert the suretyship into an autonomous instrument. It remains accessory to a valid principal debt.
The on-demand guarantee: a primary, autonomous obligation
An on-demand guarantee — variously called a performance guarantee, a call bond, or a demand guarantee — turns the accessory logic on its head. The guarantor does not promise to pay the debtor’s debt; it undertakes its own, primary obligation to pay the beneficiary on the occurrence of a stipulated event and a conforming demand, independently of the underlying contract. The leading South African authority is Lombard Insurance v Landmark, where Lombard had bound itself as principal debtor to pay the Academy on demand.
Two features of that holding do the work. First, the letter-of-credit analogy: like a bank’s irrevocable letter of credit, the guarantee stands apart from the deal it secures, so the guarantor pays first and the parties argue about the underlying contract afterwards. Second, the court emphasised that the guarantee’s reference to the underlying contract was “solely for the purpose of convenience” and was not intended to create an accessory obligation or suretyship — the very clause that tells a court which instrument it is reading.
The autonomy principle and its only escape hatch
Autonomy would be hollow if guarantors could routinely reopen the underlying contract. The recent decision in Set Square Developments v Power Guarantees (2025) restates the principle in the strongest terms: a guarantor cannot interrogate the validity or termination of the underlying agreement to resist payment, because doing so offends the autonomous and independent nature of the guarantee.
The single exception is fraud. The guarantor escapes only by proving that the beneficiary’s demand was fraudulent — a defence that, as the SCA stressed, “falls within a narrow compass” and must be established on the facts; mere error, misunderstanding or a weak underlying claim is not enough, and the party alleging fraud bears the onus. In Set Square the court also declined an invitation to recognise a broader “unconscionability” exception, holding the guarantor must pay “without interrogation of the contractual disputes between the beneficiary and the contractor”.
Drafting the difference: the clause 3.1 disclaimer
What turned both Lombard and Set Square on the autonomy side of the line was a single clause. In Set Square all three guarantees carried the now-standard wording that reference to the underlying contract is for convenience only and creates no accessory obligation or suretyship. If you want a true on-demand instrument, this is the clause to include — verbatim.
Any reference in this Performance Guarantee to the Contract is made for the purpose of convenience and shall not be construed as any intention whatsoever to create an accessory obligation or any intention to create a suretyship.
Note — This is the model disclaimer for a genuine on-demand guarantee. Conversely, if you intend an accessory suretyship, say so expressly and tie liability to the principal debt — and comply with the s 6 writing formality above. Naming the instrument correctly is the single most effective protection against a later re-characterisation.
A well-drafted on-demand guarantee will also state precisely what counts as a conforming demand (for example, a written statement of default delivered within a stated period), cap the amount, and make clear that the guarantor’s obligation is to pay money, not to perform the underlying work. Get those mechanics right and the instrument becomes, in the SCA’s phrase, a liquid document on which the beneficiary can obtain swift judgment.
Credit guarantees under the National Credit Act (s 8(5))
The National Credit Act adds a third, statutory category. Section 8(1) lists the species of credit agreement, and a credit guarantee is one of them:
Subject to subsection (2), an agreement constitutes a credit agreement for the purposes of this Act if it is— (a) a credit facility, as described in subsection (3); (b) a credit transaction, as described in subsection (4); (c) a credit guarantee, as described in subsection (5); or (d) any combination of the above.
The definition of a credit guarantee is in s 8(5) — and the closing words are everything. Whether a suretyship or guarantee is itself caught by the NCA depends not on its own form but on whether the underlying credit agreement is one to which the Act applies:
An agreement, irrespective of its form but not including an agreement contemplated in subsection (2), constitutes a credit guarantee if, in terms of that agreement, a person undertakes or promises to satisfy upon demand any obligation of another consumer in terms of a credit facility or a credit transaction to which this Act applies.
Note — The qualifier “to which this Act applies” is decisive. A suretyship or guarantee for an underlying loan that is outside the NCA — for example a loan to a juristic person above the R1 000 000 threshold, or a large agreement — is not a credit guarantee under s 8(5), even though it is plainly a guarantee in the ordinary sense.
So the analysis is two-step. First ask whether the underlying obligation is a credit facility or credit transaction to which the NCA applies. Only if it is can the security be a credit guarantee — in which case the Act’s protections (and the duty to register as a credit provider, now at a nil (R0) threshold) come into play. If the underlying agreement is excluded, the guarantee is governed purely by the common law of suretyship or demand guarantees.
Substance over form: The Profit Hub v Zuwon
The firm’s anchor authority shows the whole framework in motion. In The Profit Hub (Pty) Ltd v Zuwon Consultants (Pty) Ltd the Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether an invoice-“discounting”/factoring arrangement — backed by a written suretyship in which Mr Ndawonde bound himself “as surety and co-principal debtor” — was a purchase of debt or a loan, and whether the NCA applied. The starting point was the characterisation discipline that governs every credit and security document:
Applying that triad — the unitary text-context-purpose method of Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality — the court found the deal was a loan dressed as a discount, with the cession of debts serving as security for repayment rather than a sale. The presence of a suretyship pointed the same way:
Crucially, holding the deal a loan did not make the NCA apply. The court found there was “no credit facility granted to Zuwon, and no autonomy to decide from time to time how to make use of this facility” — the draw-down autonomy that the case law treats as the essence of a credit facility. The two commercial archetypes of a credit facility were explained in JMV Textiles, which the SCA relied on:
The first is the supply of goods or services at the consumer’s request and either the deferment of the obligation to pay the price or periodic billing of part of the amount. The second is the payment by the credit provider of amounts to either the consumer or third parties at the consumer’s request, where the obligation to repay is deferred or is the subject of periodic billing in respect of part of the amount. The former aptly describes the position with store charge cards or accounts and the latter the position with credit cards.
And in any event the Act did not apply, because the consumer was a juristic person and the agreements were large agreements above the relevant thresholds. The lesson for security drafting is direct: had the underlying loan been one “to which this Act applies”, the suretyship behind it might well have been a credit guarantee under s 8(5), pulling the lender into the NCA. Because the loan was excluded, the suretyship was governed by the ordinary common law — and Mr Ndawonde, as surety and co-principal debtor, remained jointly and severally liable for the company’s debt.
A practical checklist for finance and security documents
Before you choose, draft or sign a guarantee or suretyship, work through these questions in order:
- Which instrument do you actually want? Accessory security that follows the debt (suretyship), or autonomous “pay first, argue later” security (on-demand guarantee)? The choice drives everything below.
- If a suretyship, comply with s 6. Reduce all essential terms to a written document, signed by or on behalf of the surety. An oral or incomplete suretyship is void.
- If an on-demand guarantee, disclaim the accessory link. Include the clause that reference to the underlying contract is for convenience only and creates no accessory obligation or suretyship, and specify exactly what a conforming demand looks like.
- Test the underlying debt against the NCA. Is it a credit facility or credit transaction to which the Act applies? If yes, the security may be a credit guarantee under s 8(5), and the lender may need to register. If the loan is excluded (e.g. a R1 000 000 juristic person, or a large agreement), the common law governs.
- Mind the penalties and interest. Default and penalty charges in the secured deal are subject to the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962, which lets a court reduce a penalty that is “out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor” (s 3); and mora interest runs at the prescribed rate unless otherwise agreed.
- Don’t let the label do the work. A court reads the document by its substance on the Endumeni triad. Name the instrument correctly and make its operative terms match the name.
Receivables-financed lending often layers a cession of book debts over a suretyship, exactly as in Profit Hub. If you are structuring or signing such a deal — or unsure whether your “guarantee” is really an accessory suretyship — book a consultation before you sign.
Frequently asked questions
A suretyship is an accessory obligation: the surety pays the principal debtor’s debt, so the surety’s liability follows the underlying debt and falls away if that debt is invalid, paid or extinguished. It is void unless it is in a written document signed by or on behalf of the surety (s 6, General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956). An independent / on-demand guarantee is the opposite: a primary, autonomous obligation to pay on a conforming demand, wholly independent of the underlying contract. In Lombard Insurance v Landmark the SCA held the only escape is proof of fraud on the beneficiary’s part. People use “guarantee” loosely for both, but the legal regimes are entirely different.
No. The whole point of an on-demand guarantee is its autonomy. In Set Square Developments v Power Guarantees [2025] ZASCA 64 the SCA held that any interrogation into the termination of the underlying agreement “offends against the autonomous and independent nature of the guarantee”. Where the guarantee says reference to the contract is for convenience only and creates no accessory obligation or suretyship, the guarantor must pay on a conforming demand. The only defence is the narrow fraud exception — and the party relying on it bears the onus of proving the beneficiary acted fraudulently.
Yes. Section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 makes a suretyship void — not merely unenforceable — unless its terms are in a written document signed by or on behalf of the surety. The writing must capture the essential terms: the creditor, the surety, the principal debtor, and the nature and amount of the principal debt. The only carve-out is the liability of the signer of an aval under the law of negotiable instruments.
Only sometimes. Section 8(5) of the NCA creates a separate category — a credit guarantee — where a person promises to satisfy on demand another consumer’s obligation under a credit facility or credit transaction “to which this Act applies”. The qualifier is decisive: a guarantee for an underlying debt that is itself outside the NCA — say a loan to a juristic person whose asset value or turnover equals or exceeds R1 000 000 juristic-person threshold, or a large agreement — is not a credit guarantee under s 8(5).
It means the signatory takes on two capacities at once. As surety they secure the principal debtor’s obligation; by also binding themselves as co-principal debtor and renouncing the benefits of excussion and division, they become directly and jointly liable, so the creditor can sue them first and for the whole debt. What it does not do is sever the accessory link: a suretyship still depends on a valid principal debt. In The Profit Hub v Zuwon the surety and co-principal debtor remained jointly and severally liable for the company’s debt once the loan was established.